We introduce a general Principal-Agent model with subjective evaluation and malfeasance characterized by two-sided asymmetric information on performance that allows for an arbitrary information structure. Two generic contract forms are studied. Downloadable! We introduce a general Principal-Agent model with subjective evaluation and malfeasance characterized by two-sided asymmetric information on performance that allows for an arbitrary information structure. Two generic contract forms are studied. An authority contract has the Principal reveal his information before the Agent responds with her information. Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation Macleod, W. Bentley 2003-03-01 00:00:00 Abstract This paper extends the standard principal–agent model to allow for subjective evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures. CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): 1I would like to thank Canice Prendergast for suggesting this problem and for helpful comments on a first draft. I also greatly appreciated the comments of Janet Currie and Jonathan Levin, and thank Mehdi Farsi for excellent This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjective evaluation. Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evalutaion (AER 2003) Bentley MacLeod I Investigate the form of the optimal contract when it is based on the principal’s and the agent’s subjective signals. I The standard model of subjective evaluation assumes that signals to performance are common knowledge (but not Optimal Efficiency-Wage Contracts with Subjective Evaluation∗ Jimmy Chan† Bingyong Zheng‡ November 20, 2008 Abstract We study a T-period contracting problem where performance evaluations are subjec-tive and private. We find that the principal should punish the agent if he performs poorly in the future even when the evaluations were good
22 Jul 2003 This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjective evaluation. It is shown that the optimal contract entails the use of
subjectively evaluate the incentive distortions caused by the imperfect objective performance measure. In this case, the optimal incentive contract attaches a 23 Feb 2015 contract puts more weight on subjective measures (because the improved of) the notion of mist in performance evaluation by requir-ing that William Bentley MacLeod (born 1954) is a Canadian-American economist. He is the Sami Mnaymneh Professor of Economics and Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and an Affiliated Faculty at Columbia Law School. He is a specialist in the fields of law, labor and contract theory. " Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic 11 Oct 2018 The wage and communication pattern results from optimal contracting with standard preferences. To explain these empirical observations, I study
Subjective performance evaluation, however, is also fraught with some problems Before deriving the optimal reports of the supervisor for inequality averse agents, we MacLeod, W. B. (2003): Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation.
Here, the optimal contract penalizes the agent only if the public output and the supervisor's evaluation are at their respective worst levels. The supervisor is Optimal contract: w (q) = (. wH if q q2. wL if q = q1 and t(q) = wH for all q . – Principal pays a constant wage, and he “burns” money in the lowest state. – Intuition: subjectively evaluate the incentive distortions caused by the imperfect objective performance measure. In this case, the optimal incentive contract attaches a 23 Feb 2015 contract puts more weight on subjective measures (because the improved of) the notion of mist in performance evaluation by requir-ing that William Bentley MacLeod (born 1954) is a Canadian-American economist. He is the Sami Mnaymneh Professor of Economics and Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University and an Affiliated Faculty at Columbia Law School. He is a specialist in the fields of law, labor and contract theory. " Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic
and Contract Enforcement”, Journal of Economics Literature (2007); and " Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic Review ( 2003).
We introduce a general Principal-Agent model with subjective evaluation and malfeasance characterized by two-sided asymmetric information on performance that allows for an arbitrary information structure. Two generic contract forms are studied. Downloadable! We introduce a general Principal-Agent model with subjective evaluation and malfeasance characterized by two-sided asymmetric information on performance that allows for an arbitrary information structure. Two generic contract forms are studied. An authority contract has the Principal reveal his information before the Agent responds with her information. Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation Macleod, W. Bentley 2003-03-01 00:00:00 Abstract This paper extends the standard principal–agent model to allow for subjective evaluation. The optimal contract results in more compressed pay relative to the case with verifiable performance measures. CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): 1I would like to thank Canice Prendergast for suggesting this problem and for helpful comments on a first draft. I also greatly appreciated the comments of Janet Currie and Jonathan Levin, and thank Mehdi Farsi for excellent This paper extends the standard principal-agent model to allow for subjective evaluation. Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evalutaion (AER 2003) Bentley MacLeod I Investigate the form of the optimal contract when it is based on the principal’s and the agent’s subjective signals. I The standard model of subjective evaluation assumes that signals to performance are common knowledge (but not Optimal Efficiency-Wage Contracts with Subjective Evaluation∗ Jimmy Chan† Bingyong Zheng‡ November 20, 2008 Abstract We study a T-period contracting problem where performance evaluations are subjec-tive and private. We find that the principal should punish the agent if he performs poorly in the future even when the evaluations were good Optimal contracts based on subjective performance evaluations and reciprocity in response to ego-threatening feedback and show how these conflicts might stabilize principal-agent relationships based on subjective performance evaluations. We consider a principal who wants to motivate an agent to spend effort on a project – a complex good
9 Feb 2016 in a variety of design contracts that involve subjective evaluation for the optimal contract such as the use of right of refusal and multiple
On Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation W. Bentley MacLeod 1 TheUniversity of Southern California Los Angeles,CA 90089-0253 June 2001 1I would like to thank Canice Prendergast for suggesting this problem and for helpful comments on a first draft. I also greatly appreciated the comments of Janet Currie and Jonathan Levin, and thank Mehdi Farsi for excellent